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Long Term Changes, 1869—1938
•National income is the earnings of current effort
accumulatedassets,tangible and intangible. The
facilities employed in producing itare a heritage
past, improved in the present, and passed on to th
Long term changes init indicate how this country
the levels enjoyed in the immediate past and afford a b
judging the prospects of a continuation of its growth.
Information needed to trace long term changes in national
income and its composition is more scanty than that for recent
years; and the estimates for a more distant past are subject
to a wider margin of error than those for years beginning with
1919. Nevertheless, estimates of national income by final use
categories can be constructed to form a continuous series of
decade averages, overlapping by five-year periods, from 1869-
78 through 1929-38. From other estimates we can get some
notion of long term changes in the distribution by industrial
Total and Per Capita
e decade estimates
Table 10, present
TFor a discussion of the problems of measuring national income in wartime and an
analysisof the estimatesfor World Wars I and IIseeNational Product in








origin and by type of payment. While these series could be
continued through 1944, it seemed better to stop with 1938,
for the interpretation of war production, the chief influence
since 1940, in terms of the secular growth of the economy is
difficult. In a few years a better view of the extent to which
the prewar trends have continued or were modified can be
attained.7
of national income, total and per capita,





National Income, 1929 Prices,
Decade Estimates,
AVERAGE PER YEAR
Total and Per Capita
1869- 1938
1 National Product since 1869) Table II 16, col.10.
2 Averages of annual estimates in Statistical Abstract, p.11.
the average rate of increase;
swings, variously designated as
trend-cycles, or long cycles. '\rVe
of growth and the retardation
trend-cycles to the last Section
Since 1869, national income.
most 19 percent per quinquenni
cent; income per capita at 8.5
its retardation; and tbe long
secondary secular movements,
discuss below the average rate
init,leaving the subject of
of this Part.
has grown at the
urn; population at
percent (line 14).



















































































































































product.The percentagerates ofchangefrom onedecadeto
thenextincolumns 4-6revealclearlythethreeaspectsof
longtermgrowth thatquantitative recordsusually exhibit:
lative effect of these










of the last, 1929-
rates is evident in
decade, 1869-78, to
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38: national income multiplying almost eightfold; population
and income per almost tripling. Even if our estimates
understate the true level of national income by as much as
10 percent in 1869-78 and 5 percent in national in-
come would still show a rise to seven times its level in the first
decade of the period; and income per capita to a level about
two and a half times that for 1869-78.
Whether such a rise in six decades is unusual can be judged
partly from a comparison with the long term experience of
other countries, partly from the experience of this country at
other times. By either standard it was among the highest. Of
the four countries for which we have rough estimates for an
equally long recent period—Great Britain, Sweden, Germany,
France—Sweden alone shows approximately the same rate.
However, countries that began to industrialize later, notably
Japan and the USSR, have higher rates,if over somewhat
shorter periods.9 Nevertheless, a record, such asis shown in
Table 10ismatched only by the kind of secular growth
characteristic of a period of rapid industrialization.
Comparisons with growth in this country's past afford other
confirmatory evidence. Estimates for the years preceding the
Civil War (back to 1800) can be only of the crudest. But
they indicate that with respect to the growth of national in-
come and of income per capita (but not of population), the
rates for the recent six decades are distinctly higher than those
between 1800 and 1860.10
Thoughthe rates of growth of national income, total and
per capita, are high, one must not overstress their significance
as measures of increase in capacity to produce or in economic
welfare. That income per capita rose from less than $250
in 1869-78 to about $600 in 1919-38 (col. 3) 'does not mean
that the average capacity to' produce rose by the same ratio;
or that on the average the people of this country were over
SFor a more detailed discussion of this possible understatement see National Product
since 1869(NationalBureau of Economic Research, 1946), Part II, Sec. 1-4.
°Colin Clark givesestimatesforvariouscountries inConditions of Economic
Progress, particularly Ch. IV.
10See Robert F. Martin, National Income in the United States, 1799-1938 (National
Industrial Conference Board, 1939),Table1,pp.6-7.34 PARTIL,
twice as well-off in the 1920's as in the 1870's. Between the
beginning and end of the period covered in Table 10 basic
conditionsof work and lifechanged too greatlyforthe
quantitative differe,nces in dollar value estimates, even at con-
stant prices, to have exact meaning in terms of productive
performance or economic welfare. Technological changes in
conditions of work have meant not so much increased capacity
to produce the same things with lesseffortas capacity to
produce things that could not be made earlier—products that
either satisfy already established wants more satisfactorily or
cater to new tastes and desires. It is, therefore, difficult to make
exact comparisons of productive performance, even between a
mule and a tractor—let alone between a horse and an airplane.
And itis equally difficult to compare the welfare significance
of various goods to an urban dweller in the twentieth century
and to a village dweller of the 1870's. Such comparisons are
possible only by applying criteria of technical performance or
human well-being that are outside the changing short term
viewpointsof the market place whence economistsderive
theiryardsticks.Onecansayonlythattherecordin
Table10indicateslargegrowthinproductpercapita,
inthe country's capacity to produce, even when measured
per member ofitsvastlygreaterpopulation.Presumably
this means a substantial increase in economic welfare or power
per capita—but exactly how much canciot be said..
That the rate of growth declined isclearly suggested by
the entries in columns 4-6. Fluctuations, to be discussed below,
obscure the general downward trend; but the latter is revealed
when figures are averaged. The averages in lines 15-17, group-
ing the decades that are comprised in the distinguishable long
swings, reveal the decline in therate, of growth clearly; in
total national income from about 27 percent per quinquennium
in the first part of the period to about 9 percent in the last
part; in population from about 12 to 6.5 percent; in income
per capita from 13.5 to less than 3 percent. An adjustment
for maximum possible understatement in the first two decades
does not change the picture materially:it reduces the geo-
metric mean for total national income in line 15 to 23.5 per-LONG TERM CHANGES, 1869-1938 35
centand for income per capita to 10.7 percent. Likewise, if
we fit a straight line (by the method of least squares) to •the
percentage ratesof increasein columns 4-6(converted to
logarithms), we find that for the period as a whole the lines
slope downward, indicating retardation.11
Even if we exclude the last two decades as severely affected
by the depression of 1929-32, and regroup the remaining entries
in sets of four with one overlapping, the average percentage
increase in national income drops to 17 percent per quinquen-
nium in the last period from either 27 or 23.5inthe first,
as we discard or accept the maximum adjustment for under-
in population to8.Spercent from 11.6; and in
income per capita to .7.5 percent from either 13.5 or 10.7.
The significance for the future of this retardation in the
rate of growth is more easily assessed for total national in-
come and population than for income per capita. It does not
seem likely that growth in the former two during the next
six decades will be of the same relative magnitude as that
from 1869-78 to 1929-38. Statements concerning a country's
economic future are always hazardous. But there are no signs
that the population of this country will triple during the next
sixty years as it did between the early 1870's and early 1930's.
Indeed, recent estimates put the total in the 1990's at about
167 million—a riseof only 33 percent from the1929-38
decade; and assume a rate'of growth per quinquennium that
will be materially lower in the immediate future (2.5 percent)
thanit was during 1914-38 (6.5), and will drop gradually
to almost zero by 1995.12 Under such conditions of popula-
tion growth, even a constant rate of increase in income per
capita would mean a declining rate of growth in total national
income. Unless income per capita showed a tendency toward
'1These lines were fitted to the series in Table .10 and to the estimates for com-
ponents in orderto bringoutmoreclearly the timing and, amplitude of fluctuations
inthe rates of growth. For the constants see Tables 19-21.
'2See Estimatesof Future Population of 1/se United 1940-2000 (National
Resources PlanningBoard, Washington,D.C.,1943),Table 8,p.74.Wechose
the figures based on the assumption of medium fertility, medium mortality, with
noimmigration,nowarlosses.36 .. PARTI!
an accelerated rate of increase sufficient to compensate for the
decline in the rate of population growth, total national in-
come would continue to increase at a declining rate. If contin-
ued long enough, this would mean reaching a limit beyond
which only insignificant growth could take place. In any event,
itisunlikely that national income, during the coming sixty
0years,will multiply eightfold,asit. did between the early
1870's and early 1930's: for that would entail a rise in
capita income exceeding that in this country, or probably else-
where, during an equally long period.
The prospect that neither population nor national income
will- grow in the future at the high rate of the sixty years
preceding World War II; or even that their growth is likely
tobeat increasingly slower rates as compared with the last
part of the sixty years covered in Table 10 is disturbing only
if. one considers a population and total product much larger
than the present an assurance of the country's survival in a
hostiie world. Disregarding such considerations, whose validity
can scarcely be judged here, one may doubt that a high rate
of population growth in the future is compatible with the main-
tenance or desirable increase of income per capita. A population
of over 350million(i.e.,three times that of 1929-38) by
the early 1990's could be sustained at the present income and
hence standard of living per capita only ifa technological
revolution of a scope wider even than that suggested by such
recent events as the atomic bomb occurred. And the main-
tenance of the of increase of even the depressed 1930's
(4.4 percent per quinquennium, Table 10,line13,col.5)
wouldbring the population to over 210 million by the early
1990's.
If we disregard questionsofdesirabilitybut grant the
prospects of a slower growth of population and possibly of
total national income, what isthe implication of the record
of income per capita? If the population grows more slowly,
will income per capita also? Or will the slower growth of
population permit a more rapid increase in income per capita
than in the past?
The record does not indicate as great a decline in the firstLONG TERM CHANGES, 1869-1938 37
part of the period in the rate of growth of income per capita
as in that of population and of total income. An adjustment
for maximum understatement in 1869-78 and 1874-83 lowers
the average rate of growth in lines 15 and 18(col. 6)to
10.7 percent, reducing the drop to the average for the middle
part of the sixty. year span (lines 16 and 19). The rate of
increase drops materially in the last part of the period (to 2.6
percent) when we include the decade of the depressed 1930's;
not so much (to 7.5 percent) when we. exclude that decade.
All in all, however, the record suggests a retardation in the
rate of growth of income per capita, but at a more moderate
pace than in total national income.
Continuation of past trends would thus mean a decline in
the rate of grdwth in national income per capita, moderate,
or sizable depending upon our judgment of the secular signi-
ficance of the 1929-32 depression and of the incomplete recov-
ery from it. But whether we can assume a continuance of the
trends shown in Table 10 depends partly upon the validity
of taking 1869-1938 as the base, partly upon the continuance
of the type of social organization and the drives that have
characterized this country. One could argue that the period
chosen tends to exaggerate retardation in long term growth
because it begins with the intensive reconstruction shortly after
the Civil War and ends with the severe depression of the
1930's. Also, changes that would provide new incentives and
new possibilities for either accelerated growth or at least for
growth at rates not below those of the recent •past are not
out of the question. The very retardation of the rate of in-
crease in population is,in a country with necessarily limited
resources, a factor favorable to higher levels of per capita
product;.and a combination of a very moderate rate of growth
in population with a high rate of growth in income per capita
has been observed in the past (e.g., in Sweden). On the other
hand, it not difficult to find factors that would brake the rate
of in income per capita even more than is suggested
by Table 10. No conclusive answer can be given here. While
summarizing some aspects of our economic experience for a
long period and reflecting the continuous operation of38 PART II
tions that are likely. to survive and to exhibit the changing
pattern they have during the long term past, the estimates
contribute only one datum of importance in evaluating the
probable linesof growth of the economy. Before they can
yieldareasonable prognosis ofthefuture,they must be
supplemented by direct consideration and evaluation of the
factors that made for growth and retardation in the past.
One must be particularly wary of interpreting retardation
in secular growth observed in the past, or even its extrapola-
tion to the future, as verifying theories of economic maturity
or secular stagnation that have become current recently. One
may and should grant that data for the past, such as the
estimates presented above, indicateadistinct retardation in
the rate of growth in population, national income, and in-
come per capita. Given theforecasts of future population
characterized by a marked damping of growth, and the failure
of experience to show long term acceleration in the rate of
growth in income per capita, one may reasonably infer that
a retarded rate of growth is likely also in total national in-
come,if not unavoidably in income per capita.But these
inferencesarcnot uniquely relatedtosuch theses of the
of secular stagnation asthe prospective shortage of
private investment opportunitiesrelativeto the amounto.f
monetary savings to be generated; the prospect of chronic
secular unemployment; or the policy conclusions as to the need
for public investment drawn from the theses just stated. One
could easily visualize a social framework within which popula-
tion,income, and even income per capita would.growat
decreasing rates, yet there would be no signs of a shortage
of privateinvestment opportunities,chronic unemployment,
etc. On the contrary, one could just as easijy visualize a situa-
tion in which these latter phenomena would occur while the
rate of increasein population, national income, and income
percapitawasaccelerating.inotherwords,proofof
these particular theses in the theory of secular stagnation.. re-
'quires data quite different from those yielded by estimates of
national income; and the association between retardation in the
long term growth of national income and the theses concerningLONG TERM CHANGES,1869-1938 39
shortages of private investment opportunities and the likeli-
hood of rising levels of secular unemployment can be demon-
strated only by an analysis of the factors that brought about
growth and retardation inthe past and are likelyto con-
tinue. In this sense, the mere observation of retardation in.
the rate of growth in the past and its simple extrapolation in-
to the future no more constitutes a proof of the theory of
secular stagnation than the observation and extrapolation of
constant or accelerating rates of• growth would constitute a
disproof.
2Distribution by Industrial Origin
The rapid growth in national income and population during
the sixtyyears before World War II was partly a concomitant,
partly a result 'of the process of industrialization. In the early
phases ofindustrializationtherelativedistributionofre-
sources and product shifted to the secondary industries, such
as mining and manufacturing, and to transportation and other
utilities. In the later phases, at least in this country, it shifted
toward the service industries.
While the estimates of the distribution of national income
(or of a closely related total, aggregate payments) by in-
dustrial origin back to 1869 in Table 11 suffer from lack of
comparability, certain long term trends in the industrial struc-
tureof nationalincome, standout. Though theshare of
agriculture in 1869 and 1879 was moderate, 20.5 percent,it
had declineçl toless than half by 1929-38. The shares of
mining and manufacturing rose .atfirst; but in the last two
or decades of' the period apparently did not rise further.
The share of construction declined during the period as a•
whole. Transportation and other public utilities, surprisingly
enough, account for a slightly declining, rather than a rising,
share—owing, perhaps, to a secular decline in prices of trans-
portation andofother utilityservicesgreaterthanthat
in prices, of goods produced by other industries. In view of
the' crudity of the estimates, the rather small decline in the
share of trade cannot be accorded too much significance. The
share of service declined somewhat from high levels in the40 PART II
TABLE 11
National Income and Aggregate Payments
Percentage Distribution by Industry, 1869-1938





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Based on Marlin's Estimates of A9greyale Payments
AVERAGE OF
1 1869 & 187920.5 1.8 13.9 5.3 11.9 15.7 14.7 4.4 11.7
2 1879 & 188916.1 2.1 16.6 5.5 11.9 16.6 13.6 4.9 12.6
3 1889 & 189917.1 2.5 18.2 4.9 10.7 16.3 11.8 6.0 12.0
DECADE
4 1899-08 16.7 3.1 18.4 '1.5 10.7 15.3 9.6 5.6 16.0
5 1904-13 17.0 3.3 18.9 4.3 11.0 15.0 8.9 5.4 16.2
6 1909-18 17.7 3.3 20.8 3.2 10.7 14.5 8.2 6.3 15.4
7 1914-23 15.2 3.3 22.2 3.0 11.0 14.0 8.3 7.9 15.0
8 1919-28 12.2 3.1 22.2 3.9 11.3 13.7 9.4 8.6 15.7
DECADE Based on NBER Estimates of National Income
9 1919-28 10.5 2.5 21.9 4.4 9.8 '13.6 11,6 9.6 16.1
1) 1924-33 8.7 1.9 19.6 4.2 10.4 133 13.4-11.8 16.7
11 1929-38 8.5 1.7 19.4. 2.9 10.0 13.6 13.914.4 15.6
LINE
1-8 Based on estimates in R. F. Martin, National Income inthe United Stales,
1799-1938 (National Industrial Conference Board, 1939), particularly Tables
1,16, 40, 43, and 46. Mr. Martin's 'total realized income' is most comparable
with our total of aggregate payments (exci. entrepreneurial savings). 'Miscel-
laneous income ofprivateorigin'(see Table 43),largelyrent,and'net
international transfers of dividends and interest' (Table 4-6) were included in
the 'finance and miscellaneous' category. In lines1-3rentsare distributed
among the various industries; in lines 4-8 they are included under 'finance
and miscellaneous', -
9-11Averages of annual estimates in National Income and Its Composition, Vol.
One, Table 59.
1870's and 1880's, then remained fairly stable, and'rose appre-
ciably in the 1920's and 1930's. The share of government rose
consistently throughout the period, but that of finance V(jflClUd
ingmiscellaneous) changed little—the rise in line 4 over line 3
being due, in all probability, to the change in the treatment of
rent. The outstanding basic shifts are the decline in the share of
agriculture, therise, then stability of the shares• of mining
and manufacturing, and the rise of the combined category of
the service industries(a total of service, government, and
finance).
The distributions in Table 11 are for national income andLONG TERM CHANGES, 1869-1938 41
aggregate payments in current prices; and differences among
thesecularmovementsofpricesofthegoods produced
by the several industries may affect trends in the apportion-
ment by industrial origin. No differential price adjustment that
would yield long term changes in the industrial composition
of national income in constant prices is possible. But a con-
tinuous series of the industrial distribution of the gainfully
occupied indicates the shifting importance of various industries,
judged not by theircontributionstorealnational product.
but by their relative shares in the most important productive.
resource—manpower.Table12 shows mostofthebasic
TABLE 12
Gainfully Occupied and Employed




AGR. MININGMPG. TION UTILITIES TRADE PINANCEGOV. MISC.
(1) (2) (3) (4)(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
YEAR GAINFULLY OCCUPIED
1 1870 51.6 1.5 16.4 5.4 4.3 6.3 0.4 1.9 12.4
2 1880 48.8 1.8 18.3 4.9 4.6 7.1 0.4 2.2 11.9
3 1890 42.5 2.0 19.3 5.9 5.9 8.1 0.7 2.5 13.2
4 1900 37.7 2.6 21.3 5.6 6.6 9.0 1.1 2.7 13.3
5 1910 30.7 2.9 21.9 6.2 8.0 9.7 1.5 3.4 15.7
6 1920 26,7 2.9 25.5 5.2 9.2 10.0 1.9 4.3 14.1
7 1930 21.3 2.4 22.3 6.2 9.1 12.7 3.0 4.9 18.1
8 1940 16.9 2.1 22.4 6.6 7.2 13.3 2.9 5.5 23.1
DECADE EMPLOYED
9 1919-28 20.6 2.6 22.8 4.0 8.0 14.0 2.7 7.2 18.1
10 1924-33 20.2 2.3. 20.9 3.9 7.2 14.6 3.1 7.6 20.1
11 1929-38 20.6 2.2 20.6 2.9 6.1 14.4- 3.2 8.5 21.5
LINE
1-8 Based on estimates made by Daniel Carson for 'Labor Supply and Employ-
ment' (WPA, National Research Project, Nov. 1939, mimeo.) and revised in
'Industrial Compositionof Manpower intheUnitedStates,1870-1940', a
pñper prepared for the Conference on Research in Income and• Wealth, 1945.
9-11 Averages of annual estimates in National Income and Its Composition, VoL
One, Table 69. For definition of 'employed' see note to Table 2.
trendsalreadysuggestedinTable11,butmuch more
conspicuously.fhe share of agriculturein the gainfully oc-
cupied drops from over one-half in 1870 to about one-sixth
in 1940. The shares of mining and manufacturing rise until
about 1920, then become stable or decline slightly—a trend
(2after 1919-28: our long series
fully occupied rather than the
last two decades with their
would distort the result. And
period inter-industry difference
pied are of the same relative
per employed 1919-38 (Table





with those in lines
would materially a
Table 2, column S.
Partly as a check
42 PART II
observable also in the share of construction, if we disregard
the depression decade 1929-38. The proportion of transporta-
tion and other public utilitiesrises, sharply and consistently,
until the last decade, confirming the suggestion advanced above
that the declinein the share of this category in aggregate
payments in current prices (in Table 11) may be due largely
to the greater secular decline in prices of transportation and
of other public utility services. The proportions of trade, finance,
government, and the service and miscellaneous industries all
show an unmistakable secular rise, the rise in the shares of
the industries concerned with rendering services rather than
producing or transporting commodities being more pronounced
in the second half of the long period than in the first.
By combining the data on the growth of national income
in Table 10, the number of the gainfully occupied underlying
Table 12, its industrial distribution, and assuming inter-industry
differences in income per gainfully occupied, we can spot some
factorscontributingtothe growth of national incomein
constant prices. We exclude from this analysis the decades
in Table 12 being for the gain-
pergainfully
employed, the inclusion of the
unusually heavy unemployment
we assume that throughout the
sin income per gainfully occu-
magnitude as those in income
2, col. 5).Thisassumption in-
(1) substituting ratios per em-
occupied; and (2) assuming
e in inter-industry differences in income per
The first error is minor, as can be seen
percentage shares in Table 12, lines 9-11,
7-8: the disparities are not of a kind that
ifect differences in the ratios established in
The second error may be more appreciable.
upon the underlying assumption, partly for
of themselves, we
in the shares of a
prices (Table 13).
'the interest the results might have in and
tried to approximate the long term changes
few industries in national income, in constantLONG TERM CHANGES, 1869-1938 43
TABLE 13
Percentage Shares of Selected Industries in National Income
(Constant Prices) and in Gainfully Occupied, 1869-1930
TOTAL
CON- COMMODITY
AGRICULTURT MININGMAN UPACTURING STRUCTION PRODUCTION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DECADE % Shares in Natronal Income in constant Prices
11869-78 27.5 1.0 17.1 6.0 51.6
21879-88 20.5 1.2 16.3 5.7 43.7
31889-98 18.4 1.7 18.8 7.2 46.1
41399-08 15.4 2.1 19.4 5.9 4-2.8
51909-18 13.0 2.5 22.5 4.8 42.8,
61919-28 10.5 2.5 21.9 4.4 39.3
AVERAGE OF % Shares in Gainfully Occupied
71870& 1880 50.2 1.6 17.3 5.1 74.3
81880 & 1890 45.6 1.9 18.8 5.4 7L7
91890 & 1900 40.1 2.3 20.3 5.8 68.5
101900 & 1910 34.2 2.7 21.6 5.9 64.4
111910 & 1920 28.7 2.9 23.7 5.7 61.0
121920 & 1930 24.0 2.7 23.9 5.7 56.3
Ratio of Share in National Income to Thai in Gainfully Occupied
13Line I ± line 7 0.55 0.62 0.99 1.18 0.69
14Line 2 ÷ line 8 0.45 0.63 0.87 1.06 0.61
15Line 3 —line9 0.46 0.74 0.93 1.24 0.67
16Line 4 ± line 10 0.45 0.78 0.90 1.00 0.66
17Line 5 ± line 11 0.45 0.86 0.95 0.84 0.70
18Line 6 ÷ line 12 0.44 0.93 0.92 0.77 0.70
LINES 1-5
1-3 Line 6 extrapolated by an index of the ratio of the physical output index for
the given industry to national income in 1929 prices. The latter is from National
Product since 1869, Table II 16, col. 10. Decade averages of indexes of output
are derived from the annual series indicated below.
Agriculture:For1897-1928,fromAmericanAgriculture,1899-1939by
Harold Barger and Hans H. Landsberg (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 1942), p.404., extrapolated back to 1869 by the index in Gross Farm
Income and indice, of Farm Production and Prices intileUnited States,
1869-1937 by Frederick Strauss and Louis H. Bean (Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D. C., 1940), Table 61, p. 126; the two series were spliced by the
average ratio for 1897-1901.
Mining: For 1899-1928, from Tue Mining industries, 1899-1939, by Harold
Barger and Sam H. Schurr(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1944),
Table A-5, p. 34-3, extrapolated back to 1869 by the index in Forecasting Busi-
ness Cycles by 'Warren M. Persons (Wiley, 1931), Table 12,pp. 170-1; the
two series were spliced by the average ratio for 1899-1904.
Manufacturing: For 1899-1928, from The Output of Manufacturing Industries,
1899-1937 and Employment in Manufacturin°g, 1899-1939 by Solomon Fabricant
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 194-0 and 1942), pp. 602 and 331,
respectively. Extrapolation back to 1869 is by the index in Forecasting Business
Cycles, Table 12, pp. 170-1; the two series were spliced by the average ratio
for 1899-1904.
4 Line 6 extrapolated by the ratio of gross construction, 1929 prices (National
(Notes to Table 13 concluded on page 44)44 PART II
This approximation is based upon a comparison of the indec
of physical output for each industry with national income, in
1929 prices. The former measures the gross output of an
industry, rather than net income originating init(i.e.,the
differencebetweengross outputand payments, forgoods
and services to other industries). The comparison, therefore,
yields a good approximation to the share of a given industry
innational income inconstant prices onlyifthereisno
pronounced trend in the proportion of net income originating
to gross output (both in constant prices). There is no way
of checking upon this assumption, but comparisons of net in-
come originating and gross value of output, in current prices,
for the last three decades (1919-28, 1924-33, 1929-38) do
not show marked shifts in the ratio, except for mining. Accept-
ing the we. can extrapolate the percentage share
of a given industry in national income in 1919-28 by an index
based on the ratio of the index of physical output to national
income in 1929 prices (Table 13, lines 1-6).
These calculations, which can be made only for the four
commodity producing industries, show long term trendsin
their shares similar to those indicated by the estimatesin
current prices in Table 11: declines iii the shares of agriculture
'3The estimate for construction, based upon an index of total new construction
rather than contract construction alone, involves anadditionalassumption—the
constancy of therelative proportion of force account construction. This partic-
ular assumption is probably invalid, since the proportion of force account construc-
tion has increased. Yet. the broad trends in the share of construction in national
income should not be completely obscured by the resulting bias.
Notesto Table .13 concluded
COLUMN
Product. since .1869, Table II5,cal. 7), to gross national product, 1929 prices
(ibid., Table II 16, col. 9).
5 Sum of cot. 1-4.
LINE6
1-4 Average of annual estimatesthe percentage share of the given industry in
national income in current prices (National Income and Its Composition, 1919-
1938, \T0JOne,Table 59).
S Sum of col.
1-4Averages of annual data in Table 12.
S Sum of col. 1-4.LONG TERM CHANGES, 1869-1938 45
and construction, and rises followed by stabilizationin the
shares of mining and manufacturing. Even the magnitudes of
the trends are not too different. Yet for agriculture the decline
in the share in Table 13 is appreciably larger than in Table
11; and for manufacturing the rise of the share in Table 13
is smaller than •in Table 11. The comparison does not warrant
identifying the trends in the apportionment of national income
in current prices with those in the distribution oi the total., in
constant prices.
The important question at the moment is whether a compari-
son of the shares of industries in national income (in constant
prices) with their shares in the gainfully occupied reveals any
decided trends in inter-industry differences in income per gain-
fully occupied. The answer (Table 13, lines 13-18)is that
for two large industries—agriculture and manufacturing—the
ratioof income per gainfully occupied tothe countrywide
average is fairly constant (except the drop in agriculture dur-
ing the first decade). There is a distinct upward trend in this
ratiofor mining, and a downward trend in •theratio for
construction. But these industries are small; muèh more signi-
ficant is the near' stability of the ratio of income per gainfully
occupied to the countrywide average for the large group of
commodity producing industries as a whole.
In the light of these findingsit 'is not unreasonable to as-
sume thatrelativeinter-industrydifferencesin, income per
gainfully occupied have remained fairly stable—at least for
industries that loom large in the national total and thus deter-
mineits' growth. We canthen combine theinter-industry
differencesin income per employed establishedin Table 2,
column5,with shifts •inthe industrialdistribution of the
gainfully occupied measured in Table 12, and with data on
the absolute growth of both' income a'nd gainfully occupied,
distinguish several elements in the long term rise of national
income.
How much of the totalincrease, $59 billion,in national
income, 1875-1925, can be associated with the increase in the
number of gainfully occupied, if we disregard any rise in in-
come per gainfully occupied? Assigning to the increase in the
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number.of gainfully occupied, 30.5million,the 1875 income
per gainfully occupied ($701, in 1929 prices), we obtain $21
billion as the income ascribable to this addition to the gain-
fully occupied. This leaves $38 billion, or well over 60 per-
cent of the total increase in national income, to be associated
with the increase in income per gainfully occupied (Table 14).
This secular risein income per gainfully occupied can be
further analyzed into the rise due to. the increase in income
TABLE 14
Analysisof Rise in National Income, 1875-1925
(based on values in 1929 prices)
ABSOLUTE VALUES CHANGE OVER PERIOD
1875 19001925 1875-1925 1875-19001900-25
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 National income
($ billions) 10.6 32.0 69.5+58.9+21.4+37.5
2 Gainfully occupied
(millions) 15.1629.0745.63+30.47+13.91+16.56
3 Income per gainfully
occupied ($) 7011,1021,523+822 +401 +421
increase in National income due to increase in Gainfully Occupied and
That due to Increase in Income per Gainfully Occupied
4 Increase in total due to increase in gainfully
occupied ($ billions) +21.4 +9.8+18.2
5 Line 4 as %ofline 1 36.3 45.8 48.5
6 Increase in total due to increase in income per
gainfully occupied ($ billions)(line 1 —line4)+37.5+11.6+19.3
increaseNational income due to increase in Income per Gainfully Occupied
7 Total increase in income per gainfully
occupied ($)(line 3) +822 +401 +421
8 Intra-industry increase ($) +486 +283 +228
9 Line 8 as % of line 7 59 71 54
10 Inter4ndustry increase (md. shift in inter-
Industry relative differentials from those in
1919-38) ($)(line 7—line 8) +336 +118 +193
11 Line 10 as %ofline 7 41 29 46
COLUMNLINE 1
1-3 By straight line interpolation from Table 10.
LINEZ
V
1-3By straight line interpolation of data underlying Table 12.
LINE
1-3 Line 1 ± line 2.
LINE4
4 Line 2, col. 4, x line 3, col.1.
5 Line 2, col.5, x line 3, col.1.
6 Line 2, col. 6, x line 3, col. 2.
V
LINE8 V
4Computed as follows:LONG TERM CHANGES, 1869-1938 47
COLUMN
1925
1 National income per gainfully occupieda 1,523
AGRICULTURE
2 %sharein total gainfully occupiedb 0 24.0
3Preliminaryestimate of income per gainfully
occupied (0.5cXline 1) 762
4 Line 2 X line 3 18,288.0
MINING
5. %sharein total gainfully occupiedb 2.7
•6 Preliminary estimate of income per gainfully
occupied (O.9c X line 1) 1,371
7 Line 5 xline6 3,701.7
8-28 MFG.,.CONSTRUCTION,ETC. (7major industrial divisions)
29 Total gainfully occupied, 9 major industrial
divisions (line 2 + line 5, etc.), % 100.0
30 Total product, 9 major industrial divisions
(line 4 +line7, etc.) 149,393.3
31 Weighted av., income per gainfully occupied, 9 major
industrial divisions (line 30line29) 1,492
32 Adjustment factor (line 1 ÷line31) 1.0208
Final Estimate of Income per Gainfully Occupied for Each
of the 9 Major Industrial Di'visions
33 Agriculture (line 3 xline32) 778
34 Mining (line 6 xline32) . 1,400
35-41 Mfg., Construction, etc. (7 major industrial
Calculation of 1925 on /875 Base and Estimated Intra-industry




• (1) (2) (3)
42 Agriculture 50.2 778 39,055.6
•43 Mining 1.6 1,400 2,240.0
44-SO Mfg., Construction, etc.
(7 major industrial
divisions)
51 Total, •9 major
industrial divisions,
(lines 42-50) 100.0 118,696.9
52 Weighted av., income per gainfully occupied,
9 major industrial divisions (line 51,Col. 3 ± col. 1) 1,187
• 53 National income per gainfully occupied, 1875e
0 701
54 Intra-industry increase (line 52 —line53) 486
•aLine 3, col. 3 of Table 14.




eLine3, col.1 of Table 14.
5& 6 Con'puted by a procedure paralleling that for col. 4.48 PART II
per gainfully occupied within each of the nine major industrial
categories in Table 12 (intra-industry rise) ;and the rise due
to the shift in the distribution of the gainfully occupied from
industries in which income per gainfully occupied is below the
countrywide average(e.g.,in agrièulture)to those in which
it is above (e.g., transportation and other public utilities). Of
the total rise in income per gainfully occupied, $822 1929
prices), $486, or 59 percent, was due to the intra-industry rise
in income per gainfully occupied, and $336, or 41 percent, to
the shifts from industries with lower to industries with higher
income per gainfully occupied.14
In columns 5 and 6 a similar analysisiscarried through
separately for each half of the fifty years. In general, the
increase in national income, in the gainfully occupied, and in
income per gainfully occupiedis,inabsolute terms, larger
from 1900 to 1925. But in percentage terms, itis distinctly
:smaller: in national income it is 117 percent of the 1900 base
.as compared with 202 percent of the 1875 base; in the gain-
fully occupied, 57 percent as compared with 92 percent; in
income per gainfully occupied, 38 percent as compared with
57 percent. Thus crudely halving the full period brings out the
retardation in the percentage secular rise in national income,
population, and per capita income, shown in somewhat greater
detail in Table 10.
For each of the two quarter centuries, somewhat less than
half of the total risein national income may be associated
with the growth in the gainfully occupied and the remaining
portion with the increase in the income per gainfully occupied.
Of the latter, 71 percent during the first twenty-five years and
54 percent during the second is due to the intra-industry rise;
and 29 and 46 percent respectively to the shifts from indus-
tries with lower levels of income per gainfully occupied to•
industries with higher 'levels(inter-industry shift). That the
-14Becauseof the assumed constancy ofrelativedifferences among industries in
income per gainfully occupied and because effects of inter-industry shifts are cal-
culated as residuals,the measures inTable 14, line 10, include the effects of shifts
not only in the sharesofindustries in the total gainfully occupied but also in
relative inter-industrydifferencesinincome per gainfully occupied. The latter
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relative effect of inter-industry shifts is greater during 1900-
25 than during 1875-1900 may be due to the greater shift
(shown in Table1.2)during thislater period away from
agriculture toward the higher income per gainfully occupied
industries(public utilities,finance, government).
The crude division into two periods reveals a distinct re-
tardation in the rate of rise in income per gainfully occupied
due to the intra- but not to the inter-industry component (lines 8
and 10). The increase in income per gainfully occupied due to
intra-industry rises amounted in 1875-1900 to 40 percent of
the 1875 base, and in 1900-25 to 21 percent of the 1900 base.
Similar percentage risesassociated with inter-industryshifts
were 17 percent, 1875-1900, and 18 percent, 1900-25. While
no retardation in the increase of income per gainfully occupied
associated with the inter-industry component is observed, itis
likely to appear as the shift toward the higher income per gain-
fully occupied industries slows down andapproaches a limit.
3Distribution by Type and Size
Long term changes in the distribution of income by type can
be established for aggregate payments alone. And even .in
them, itisdifficult to find marked trends, partly because the
estimates that can be brought together for a sufficiently long
period are none too comparable.
Bearing in mind the connection the distributionof
income by type arid the character of business organization, one
would expect that the secular decline in, the relative weight
of individual firms and the rise in the relative weight of cor-
porations and of public institutions would mean a decline in
the share of entrepreneurial income and possibly of rent, and
a rise in the shares of employee compensation, dividends, and
perhaps interest. One would be. at a loss to form a similar
hypothesis concerning the, secular movement of t.hes.haie of
service income, on the one hand, i.e., of the sum of employee
compensation and entrepreneurial income, and of property
income, on the other.
The estimates confirm the hypothesis that can bçformulated
but with some qualifications (Table1.5). The share of em-SO PART II
TABLE- 15
Aggregate Payments (Current Prices)
Percentage Distribution by Type, 1870-1938
EMPLOYEE ENTREP. PBOPERT'(
COMPEN NET SERVECEDlv!- INTER• INCOME
SATION INCOME INCOME DENDS EST RENT ENCL. RENT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Basedon King's Estimates of I'alue of Product
AVERAGE OF /
11870 & 1880 50.0 26.4 76.5 15.8 7.8 23.6
21880 & 1890 52.5 23.0 75.4 16.5 8.2 24.6
31890 & 1900 50.4 27.3 '77.7 14.7 7.7 22.4
41900 & 1910 4.7.1 28.8 75.8 15.9 8.3 24.2
Basedon Martin's Estimates of Aggregate Payments exci. Entrepreneurial Saving:
DECADE
51899-08 59.5 23.8 83.3 5.3 5.1 6.4 16.7
61904-13 59.6 23.3 82.9 5.7 5.1 6.3 17.1
71909-18 59.7 23.3 83.0 6.5 4.9 5.7 17.0
81914-23 63.0 20.8 83.8 5.6 5.3 5.3 16.2
91919-28 65.1 18.3 83.4 5.4 6.0 5,2 16.6
Basedon NBER Estimates of Aggregate Payments in ci. Entrepreneurial Savings
DECADE
101919-28 61.7 19.5 81.2 5.6 6.1 7.1 18.8
111924-33 63.1 16.6 79.7 6.5 7.8 5.9 20.3
121929-38 64.9 15.9 80.8 6.6 8.4 4.3 19.2
LINE
1-4 W. I. King, The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States
(Macmillan, 1919), Table XXXI, p. 160.
5-9 Based on estimatesin National Income int/,eUnited Stales,1799-1938,
Tables 4-,41-4, and 46.
10-12 Based on estimates inNational Income and ItsComposition, Vol.One,
Table22. -
ployeecompensation does frisé during the period as a whole:
taking into consideration the differences among the various
estimates, we may setitat below 60 percent of aggregate
payments in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and
well above it in the 1920's and the 1930's. But this riseis
distinct, oniy after 'World I. The share of entrepreneurial
income declined, but also not distinctly until after 1918. The
two trends together leave the share of service -income at a
fairly constant level during the long period.
While the estimates for 1870-1910 combine dividends and
interest,therelatively small role of industrial corporatIons
around 1870 and their growth to importance by 1919 lead
one to infer that the share of dividends must have risen ap-
preciably. But since 1919 it 'seems to have risen little. TheLONG TERM CHANGES, 1869-1938 51
much greater rise in the share of interest is partly due to the
relativeinflexibility of interest during the severe depression
of the 1930's. Yet it began immediately after World War I,
reflecting the growth of government debt, which promises to
produce a further rise in the future. The proportion accounted
for by rent shows a downtrend, particularly marked in the
recent depression decades.
One cannot feel too much confidence in the reliability and
comparability of the estimates assembled in Table 15, particu-
larly those for the earlier part of the period. The• decade
averages (lines 5-12), however, show consonance of whatever
trends are observable—rise in the share of employee compen-
sation, declines in those of entrepreneurial income and rent,
recent rise in the interest share—with whatever expectations
can be formed on the basis of other knowledge of changes in
the type of business organization, growth in public debt, and
the like. And it seems reasonable to conclude that there could
hardly have very great secularshiftsintherelative
distribution between service and property income, for if there
had, they would probably find some reflection in the estimates,
crude though the latter are.
We have not data adequate to establish the existence or
absence of long term changes in the distribution of income
payments among recipients grouped by size of their income.
So far as the distribution by type has any effect on the distri-
bution by size, one would infer from Table 15 that the relative
inequalityinthesizedistribution should show no marked
secularchanges.Buttheintra-typedistributionofincome
by size is important in determining the characteristics of the
distribution of income payments by size. The inequality in
thedistributionofemployeecompensation may havein-
creased with the growth in the number of employees and with
the inclusion of highly paid corporation executives and profes-
sional employees. The inequality in the distribution of
preneurial income may have increased also with the growth
in the number of professional and other highly paid urban
entrepreneurs. The only safeinferenceisthat,giventhe
relative secular constancy in the distribution of income pay-52 PART II
ments by type, relative inequality in the size distribution of
income, so far.as it was affected by shifts in the distribution by
type, cannot have undergone marked long te'rm changes.
4Distribution by Type of Use
One tends to assume that in earlier times, with greater pres-
sure to build up the capital structure of the country, the share
of current income devoted to capital formation was probably
greater than it now is. In other words, one expects to find an
uptrend in the share of the flow, of goods to consumers and
a downtrend in the share of net capital formation.
The estimates since 1869-78 confirm this expectation, but
with significant qualifications (Table 16). First, the share of
the flow of goods to consumers isconsistently high: in no
decade is it less than 80 percent of national income, and with
two exceptions(in values in constant prices), not less than
85percent. The predominance of ultimate consumption as
the channel into which current product flows, noted for recent
decades in Part I,is a characteristic of long standing in this
country.'5
Second, while the trend in the share of the flow of goods
to consumers is upward and in the share of net capital for-
mation downward, neither is pronounced unless we include the
last two decades, which were affected by the 1929-32 depres-
sion and its aftermath. During the full period including the
l5Tbis moderate rate of capital formation may, at first glance, raise questions as
to how the rapid growth of total product and of per capita, characterizing the
period under study, was attained. In this connection, the importance of a high level
of consumption as a base for increasing productivity, already mentioned in Part I,
Section 5, should be borne in mind. In addition, two important factors, not directly
reflected in the percentages net capital formation constitutes of national income,
should be noted. First, through most of the period the country profited from large
immigration. The capitalized value of this addition tothe country's productive
population was estimated to be more than $10 billion per year in the periods of
largest immigration (1881-90 and 1901-14), and through the period 1860-1930 at
roughly $6 to $7 billion per year, at prices of the 1920's (see calculation by Dr.
Agostino de Vita, supplementing the article by Corrado Gini, Europa und Amerika:
Zwei 'Welten,Weltcwirlsc/,aftlic/,es Archi'v, July 1940, v.52, pp. 31-35). Second,
through a substantial par.t of the period the country profited from availability of
land for extensive expansion within its own boundaries.-- — -
-
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TABLE16
National Income, Percentage Distribution between
Flow of Goods to Consumers and Net Capital Formation, 1869-1938
CURRENT PRICES 1929 PRICES
Flow of Net Flow of Net
Goods to Capital Goods to Capital
DECADE Consumers Formation . Consumers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
11869-78 87.9 12.1 86.3 13.7
21874-83 87.0 13.0 85.6 14.4
31879-88 86.8 13.2 85.4 14.6
41884-93 85.9 14.1 83.9 16.1
51889-98 85.9 14.1 83.8 16.2
61894-03 86.4 13.6 85.2 14.8
71899-08 87.4 12.6 86.4 13.6
81904-13 87.9 12.1 86.9 13.1
91909-18 87.5 12.5 87.0 13.0
101914-23 87.6 12.4 88.6 11.4
111919-28 89.1 10.9 89.8 10.2
121924-33 93.3 6.7 94.0 6.0
131929-38 - 98.0 2.0 98.6 1.4
Averages
14Lines 1-5 86.7 13.3 85.0 15.0
15 5-9 87.0 13.0 85.9 14.1
16 9-13 91.1 8.9 91.6 8.4
17 1-5 86.7 13.3 85.0 15.0
18 4-8 86.7 13.3 85.3 14.7
19 7-11 87.9 12.1 87.8 12.2
Calculated from estimatesinNational Product since1869,TableII16,coL
1,3, 6, and 8.
latter, when the decades are grouped into threesets,each
including five(with one overlapping), the share of the flow
of goods to consumers (in constant prices)rises from 85to
86 to 92 percent; the share of net capital formation declines
from 15 to 14 to 8 percent,. i.e.,it is almost cut in half. If we
exclude the last two decades, the decline in the share of capital
formation is much less—from 15 percent in the early part of
the period to somewhat over 12 percent in the last part. Also,
this drop is rather minor, and the underlying estimates are
not sufficiently preciseto warrant confidencein such small
changes. The decade estimates indicate that the decline was
especially sharp after World War I, which suggests a con-
nection with the upsurge in the flow of certain types of con-
sumer goods whose supply was restricted during the war years.
Setting aside the secular significance of the depression of the
1930's, we can say that if a long term decline in the propor-54
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tion of net capital formation has occurred, it has been quite
moderate so far.
The composition of the flow of goods to 'consumers and of
net capital formation also shifted (Table 17). In the former,
the main long term trend is the rise in the share of services
not embodied in new commodities. In both groupings of decades,
this share rose from 28 percent to one-third or more—an
effect of both urbanization and the shift in demand toward
services as the standard• of living rose. There was also some
tendency toward a rise in the share of consumer durable com-
modities—as part of the total flow of goods to consumers,
and still more, of course, as part of the total flow of corn-
rnodities to consumers. The shares of perishable and of semi-
durable commodities declined.
These secular changes in the composition of the flow of
goods to consumers are not unexpected; indeed, they are a
matter of common observation. That despite the length of the
period covered, the rapid succession of technological changes,
the sustained and cumulative growth of the supply of goods
per consumer, the conspicuous shifts in consumers' tastes and
modes ofliving,these secular changes, particularlyinthe
percentage apportionment of commodity flow, were not greater
is due largely to the fact that the various innovations tended
to affect the several broad categories of commodities rather
than only one. For example, the introduction and spread of
passenger cars meant additions only to consumer durable
commodities but also to perishable (gasoline, oil), semidurable
(tires), and services(repairs,garage service,etc.). Much
greater shiftsinthe composition of consumer commodities
could perhaps be observed if we had narrower categories. In
the broad classification by durability in Table 17, the only
marked secular change isin the apportionment between com-
modities and services.
The secular shiflfs in the composition of net capital forma-
tion are more pronounced (Table 17, lines 5-8). From 1869-
78 to 1929-38 the shares of construction and of net additions
to inventories declined: the former from over 70 percent in
the first set of five decades to about 50percentitt the last set;LONG TERM CHANGES, 1869-1938 55
TABLE17





1-5 5-9 9-13 1-5 4-8 7-11
(1) (2) (3) (4.) (5) (6)
FLOW OF GOODS TO CONSUMERS (AVERAGESOF PERCENTAGES)
IPerishable 44.3 43.5 40.2 44.3 43.8 41.4
2Semidurable 18.4 17.2 15.2 18.4 17.6 16.2
3Durable 9.1 9.1 9.4 9.1 9.3 9.2
4Services 28.2 30.3 35.2 28.2 29.3 33.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
NET CAPITAL FORMATION (PERCENTAGES OFAVERAGE VALUES)
SProducer durable 13.9 17.5 22.0 13.9 15.9 21.4
6Construction 70.6 65.4 49.3 70.6 72.3 51.9
7Net addition to inventories18.3 13.7 12.1 18.3 13.4 15.6
8Net changes in claims against
foreign countries —2.8 3.4 16.6 —2.8 —1.5 11.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Calculated from estimates in National Product since. 1869,TableII8,col.6-10,
and Table II15,col. 6-10. The decade numbers are those used in Table 16.
the latter, from 18 to 12 percent. The shares of producer
durable equipment and net additions to claims against foreign
countries rose: the former from 14 to 22 percent and the
latter from a minus quantity to 17 percent of the total. Even
if we exclude the last two decades as distorted by the depres-
sion of 1929-32, the secular trends in the composition of net
capital formation away from construction and inventory ac-
cumulation and toward producer durable equipment and addi-
tions to claims against foreign countries are evident.
While th& range of error in the estimates of various com-
ponents of net capital formation is fairly wide, especially for
the smaller items such as flow to inventories and additions to
claims against foreign countries, the existence of these trends,
if not their exact magnitude, can be asserted with confidence.
As a country is industrialized, builds up its basic capital struc-
ture, and the growth in population retards,the share of
construction in net capital formation (which includes all resi-
dentialconstruction)declines.Likewise,asitsdistribution
and transportation systems improve, and the proportion of
seasonal industries(e.g.,agriculture)declines, the share of
and Net Capital Formation
Type of Use, 1869-1938
in 1929 prices)56 PARTII
net additions to inventories also declines. As a country be-
comes an international creditor rather than• adebtor,the
relative importancenet capital formation of additions to
claims against foreign countries rises; and as a large share
ofcapitalinvestment goesintoequipment and residential
construction plays a smaller role, the proportion of producer
durable equipment increases.
For the major components of net capital formation, con-
struction, and producers' equipment, apportionment by broad
industrial categories of users can be estimated back to 1880.
The data for the years prior to the 1920's are the successive
wealth estimates, which have to be adjusted for both changes
in valuation and the inclusion of nonreproducible wealth, such
as land. They check only very roughly and over twenty-year
spans with cumulated totals of net capital• formation derived
from data on commodity flow. Nevertheless, the orders of
magnitude indicated by the combination of these wealth and
capital formation data are sufficiently reliable to paint a broad
picture of changes in the industrial destination Of net additions
to construction and equipment (Table 18).
In general, the share of private industries (agriculture, min-
ing, manufacturing, etc., excluding public utilities and residential
construction), which was well over one-third during the first
twenty years, rose to 46 percent in the second twenty, then
declined to one-eighth of the tOtal in the last The
share of public utilities remained fairly constant for the first
two periods—at about 30 and 26 percent—then rose to 37
percent in the third. That of residential construction declined
consistently, from 25percentin the first twenty years to 17
percent in the last. The share of net construction and flow of
equipment under all private auspices has always been large,
but declined from 92 percent in the first twenty years to 91
percent in the second, and to 67 percent in the 'third. The
share of the tax exempt category, which includes government
and other activities under public auspices but is dominated by
the former, rose in the last twenty years to 33 percent of the
total,from below 10 percent duringthe'precedingforty
years, indicatingadefinite upsurgeinthe share of 'publicr
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• TABLE 18
Industrial Distribution of Increase in Value of
Real Estate Improvements and Equipment, .1880-1939
(based onalues in 1929 prices)
• JUNE 1, JUNE 1, JAN. 1, JUNE 1,
lS8Oro 1900T0 1919To l8SOTo
JUNE1, JAN. 1, JAN.1; JAN. 1,
1900 1919 1939 1939
(1) (2) (3) ('i)
% Share of Various Industrial Cate9ories
1 Private industry, exci. public utilities 36.1 46.1 12.5 34.0
2 Public utilities 30.4 26.0 37.2. 30.4
3 Residential .. 25.4' 19.1 ..16.9 • 20.8
4 Total private 91.9 91.3 66.6 85.2
5 Tax exempt 8.1 8.7 33.4 14.8
6 Total of above 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% Share of Each Period within Industrial
7Privateindustry, exci. public utilities 37.7 53.0 9.3 100.0
8Public utilities 35.5 33.5 31.0 100.0
9 Residential . 43.4 36.0 .20.6 100.0
Totalprivate 38.3 41.9 19.8 100.0
11 Tax exempt 19.4 23.1 57.4 100.0
12 Total of above 35.5 39.1 25.4 100.0
•% Rise in Durable' Reproducible Wealth
13 Private industry, publicutilities 166.2 97.2 8.2 441.4
14 Public utilities 172.2 65.4 34.6 484.7
15 Residential 183.5 58.9 20.0 422.9
16 Total private 172.7 76.3 19.3 451.0
17 Tax exempt 259.7 95.0 114.71,336.6
18 Total of above 177.5 77.6 26.8 499.9
19 Total wealth (line 18 + business in-
ventories & claims against foreign
countries) 169.8 92.9 32.4 557.6
LINE COLUMN 1
1-12 Based on absolute totals in National Prodna since 7869, Table IV 13, Part B,
cal. 1.
13-18 Based on absolute totals in ibid., Table IV 12, Part 8, col. 1 and 3.
19 Based on absolute totals in ibid., Table IV 10, cal.6, lines 1 and' 3.
COLUMN 2
1-12 Derived from ibid., Table IV 13, Part B, col. 2.
13-18 Derived fromibid.,Table IV 12, Part B, cot. 3, and Table IV 7, cot. 3 and
6. The rates were adjusted to a 20-year basis to establish comparability
with those in col.1 and 3.
19 Derived from the totals underlying line 18 plus ibid., Table IV 10, line3,
cal.3 and 4, for 1900, and line10,col.3 and 4,for 1919. The rate was
adjusted to a 20-year basis.
COLUMN 3
1-12Derived from ibid., TableIV 13, Part B, cal. 4.
13-18 Derived from ibid.and Table IV 12, Part B, col. 6.
19 Additions to totals underlying line 18 from ibid., Table IV 10, lines 10and12.
COLUMN 4
See notes to col. 1-3.58
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construction and equipment during the two decades following
World War I. The total increase in value for all sixty years
(col. 4) is distributed about one-third to private industry (ex-
cluding publicutilitiesand residentialconstruction) ;about
three-tenths to public utilities; about one-fifth to residential
construction; and about one-seventh to activities under public
auspices.
These differencesintheshares of the broad industrial
categories of users among the three periods mean differences
also in the shares contributed during each period to the total
for the sixty years. Of total net construction and equipment
added to private industry (excluding public utilities and resi-
dential construction)the first period contributed 38 percent;
the second, though somewhat shorter, 53percent;and the
third, only slightly over 9 percent. For public utilities, there
was a consistent though moderate decline in the contribution
of each period. Of the total added to residential construction,
the share of thefirst period was about 43 percent; of the
second, 36 percent; of the third, only21.percent. Of the
totaladdedtoconstructionandequipment underpublic
auspices, on the contrary, considerably less than one-half was
added during thefirstforty years, and 57percentduring
the last twenty, 1919-38.
The minor secular decline in the share of net capital forma-
tion in national income, indicated by Table 16, would be big-
ger were we to measure, only the share of net capital forma-
tion under private auspices. While the estimates in Table 18
do not cover net additions to inventories and to claims against
foreigncountries,they do cover the two components that
account on the average for more than three-quarters of net
capitalformation—construction and producers' equipment—
and they show a marked decline in the share of private con-
struction and equipment.
The fact that of the total sixty years' accumulation more
than one-third was added during the first twenty and much
less than one-third during the last twenty (Table 18, line 12)
suggests a retardation in the rate of growth of durable re-
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distinguished, the stock increased at a sharply declining
While that in private industry (excluding public utilities
residentialconstruction)more than quintupled during
sixty years, the percentage increaseinthefirst twenty
166 and in the last twenty 8. The declines in the per-
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ot necessarily mean a decline in
services such capital
contribute. The price and value indexes available to
construction and equipment in changing values to a
price or value base do not 'take adequate account o
proved efficiency of capital. Yet it cannot be assumed
unreflectedimprovementinefficiencywas enough60 PARTII
during the last part of the sixty years to offset the retarda-
tion in the rate of relative additions to the stock. Indeed,
one might argue that it may well have been relatively greater
between 1880 and 1900 than between 1919 and 1939. But
we do not have definite evidence on the subject; all one can
say about the figures in Table 18 is that the total stock of
capitalinthe country available for the production process
grew ata high rate during thesixty years and therate
declined sharply from the early to thelater part of the
period.
This conclusion, together with the retardation ,jnthe rate
of increaseinthe other important productive factor,viz.,
labor supply as represented by the gainfully occupied, noted
in Section 2, helps to explain the retardation in the rate of
• growth of national income. Furthermore, the reduction in the
average rate of utilization of the labor supply, as represented
by fewer working hours, and the greater retardation in the
rateof growth of reproduciblecapital thaninthe labor
supply16 at least suggest why the rate of increase in income
per gainfully occupied(disregarding unemployment) should
a:lso have declined. The subject, obviously of telling import-
,ance,awaits further exploration—not only inthis but also
that entered the phase of modern industrialization
earlier or 'later.
SFluctuatibni in Rates of Growth
The percentage changes from decade to decade in Table 10
(col. 4-6) show marked fluctuations which in their recurrence
have the appearance of cycles. 'Thus, the entries for national
income (col. 4) drop, from the large increase in the average
for 1874-83 over that for 1869-78 to a much. smaller in-
in 'the average for 1889-98 ,overthat ,for1884.93;
then the rates of change rise again, only to decline after one
or two intervals. Inspection of Table 10 reveals the existence
of atleast three such swings in the rate of growth with a
16Compare the movement of rates in Table 18, lines 18 and 19, with that of total
population(Table 10,cot.5,lines 15-20)or the gainfully occupied (Table 14,
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span from trough to trough of four to five entries, represent-
ing periods of twenty to twenty-five years.
\'Vhile the causes of such fluctuations in the rate of secular
growth are still obscure and their recurrence not too widely
known, sufficient study has been made toaffirm their exist-
ence.'7 It may be of interest to establish here their character-
isticsas revealed by the comprehensive decade estimates at
our disposal. The fact that these estimates are decade aver-
ages makesitimpossible to study the fluctuations with as
much precision as might be desired. Yet, for swings so long
in duration, even decade estimates, overlapping by five years,
sufficetoestablish the broad characteristics sof timing and
amplitude.
Inordertobring out thesecharacteristicsclearly,the
longer term trend—the downward drift—of theratesof
change from decadetodecade must beeliminated. Two
procedures were employed for this purpose. First, a straight
line was fitted to all the series, by the method of least squares,
to the logarithms of the rates of change between overlapping
171n Measuring Business Cycles (National Bureau of. Economic Research, 1946,
Ch. 11), Burns and Mitchell analyze the various, hypotheses of long cycles, testing
their validity in terms of differences in characteristics of specific short cycles be-
tween those in the rising and in the declining long phases of the presumptive long
swings. With few exceptions, no significant differences are revealed; so that one
may question whether the observed long cycles are not due merely to the averaging
out of some of the more conspicuous, irregular peculiarities of the shorter term
fluctuations observed in various aspects of economic activity.
This, however, does not justify the dismissal of these changes in the rate of
secular growth from study. That these long term swings may be nought but aver-
ages of short term cycles, in which some of the larger, irregular peculiarities of
the latter are 'stretched out' over longer periods is no more reason to dismiss them
than we can dismiss the shorter cycles themselves because they can be interpreted
asresultsofaveraging of changes essentially random in character.(Seethe
author's article on Random Events and Cyclical Oscillations, Journal of the Amer-
ican Statistical Association, Sept. 1929, pp. 258-75.) These swings in rate of secular
movement represent a component of the time series that is omitted from view if
we confine our attention to the average rate of growth and the average retardation
in it, on the one hand; and to changes in the series within the short t'erm cycles
(either specificorreference), on theother. Analysis ofthis component seems
definitely worth while, so long as we do not assign to these fluctuationsin the
secular rate of growth the character of cycles, since their periodic recurrence has
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TABLE 19
Fluctuations in Rates of Growth, National Income
Total and Per Capita (1929 Prices), 1869-1938
PERCENTAGE DEVIATIONS FROM STANDARD TREND-CYCLE
CENTRAL STRAIGHT LINE OR 3 POINT CURVE Central Trend-cycle
YEAR FITTED TO RATES OF PERCENTAGE Year of
OF CHANGE BEfWEEN OVERLAPPING DECADES of Quinquen-
PERIODNational Income Population*Per Capita Period nial Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
11876 +8.5 +0.5 +8.7 1875 —2.0
21881 +0.1 +0.5 +0.3 1880 +7.2
31886 —8.3 +0.3 —8.3 1885 —3.0
41891 —8.4 —0.4 —8.3 1890 —7.7
51896 +0.4 —0.7 +1.0 1895 —5.4
61901 +4.6 —0.3 +4.4 1900 +12.6
71906 +2.8 +0.4 +1.9 1905 +1.0
81911 —1.9 +0.2 —2.7 1910 —0.5
91916 +1.1 —0.6 +1.5 1915 ±3.0
101921 +10.1 +0.3 +9.5 1920 —7.7
111926 —0.9 +0.6 —1.4 1925 +1.5









nium —2.2 —0.6 —1.7
15Av.%devia-
tion (geometric
mean) 4.5 0.5 4.5 4.8
*Deviations from a 3 point curve; columns 2, 4, and 6, deviations from a straight line.
COLUMN
2-4 Calculated from estimates in Table 10 by methods described in the text.
5 & 6 From Arthur F. Burns, Production Trends in the United States Since 1870
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1934), Ch. V. and Table 53, p.
Burns' trend-cycles for annual rates of growth have been recalculatedto
quinquennial rates by raising them to the fifth power.
83, itis 31.3 percent. The decline is 3.0 percent or 2.2 per-
cent of 134.3.)
The main interest of Table 19is, however, in the char-
acteristics of the long swings in rates of growth. Centering
theintervalsfor which theseratesare measured, we can
observe the approximate timing of. the swings. National in-
come, population, and income per capita each have about
threeswings,although thefirstand thelast may bein-
completely covered. From an apparent peak in the interval64 .PART
centeringon 1876, the rate of change in national income and
inincome per capita declinestoa trough inthe interval
centering on1891;risestoanother peak intheinterval
centering on 1901; declines to another trough in the interval
centering on 1911; rises to the last observable peak in the
interval centering on 1921; and drops to the last observable
trough in the interval centering on 1931. The average period
between troughsistwenty years; that between peaks, 22.5
years.
The average duration of these swings indicates similarity
the secondary secular movements established in the author's
Secular MovementsinProductionand Prices(Houghton
1930, Ch. IV) and to the trend-cycles as measured by
Arthur F. Burns in his Production Trends in the United States
since 1870 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1934,
V). Because the procedures used, here are simirarto
Burns', itis of interest to compare the deviations in columns
2 and 4 with the trend-cycles as established by Burns on the
basisof various productionseriesforalarge number of
industries. The entries in column 6 constitute Burns' 'standard
trend-cycle', i.e., medians of the deviations of rates of growth
within successive decades from a straig.ht line fitted to such
rates over the full period he covers. The only modification was
to recalculate these deviations so that they applied to quin-
quennial rather than to annual rates of change.
•Thecomparisonshowsfairconformityoffluctuations
derived for national income, total and per capita (col. 2 and
4), with those derived from a variety of indexes of physical
volume of output (col. 6). There is a minor disparity inthe
first swing, Burns' series showing a low entry about 1875 and
our seriesahigh entry about1876. The agreement then
persists up to the last two entries that can be compared in
the two •series. There is some reason to suppose that the
entry for the interval centering on 1925 is too high in the
Burns series, based asit was upon incomplete coverage of
the 1929-32 depression (most series used by Burns ended in
1930). Also, the differences for the two postwar intervals,
those centering on '1875-76 and 1920-21, may be due partlyLONG TERM CHANGES, 1869-1938 65
todifferent timing of the periods covered; partly to the more
comprehensive coverage of national income, with itsfuller
reflection of the wartime declineincivilian• production and
itsgreater postwar recovery.in any collection of annual
production series, even as comprehensive as that assembled
and analyzed by Burns, highly fabricated consumer products
services not embodied in commodities tend to be neglect-
ed.10
But even taking the discrepancies as they stand, the agree-
ment between the two seriesis close enough to warrant the
conclusionthattheysupport eachotherinaffirmingthe
existence of long swings in the rates of growth, and of their
rough duration and timing for the period covered by both
studies. Another indirect but significant indication that such
swings are not a figment of statistical imaginationistheir
presence in the population series (Table 19, col. 3). In view
of thesubstantial independence of population and national
income estimates,20itissignificant that population alsore-
veals swings in the rate of growth of duration and timing not
too dissimilar to those in national income.
19The present series and those used by Burns are not completely independent. In
deriving the annual estimates for 1869-88 (converted later to overlapping decade
averages), we used, for interpolation between the Census year values, many of the
series analyzed by Burns (see National Product since 1869, Part II). Shaw's annual
series,which begin with1889,are interpolations between Census dates based
largely upon state data; but even they are dependent in part upon annual production
series used as supplementary bases of for 1889-99(see
W. H. Shaw, Value of Commodity Output since 1869, National Bureau of Econom-
ic Research, in press, particularly Table II 6). Nevertheless, the use of Census
data for the base years, and of state data for annual interpolation the period
since 1889, as well as the wider coverage of our 'series, mean that the latter are
largely independent of the data Burns used. Conformity, or lack of conformity,
between the fluctuations in the rate of change shown by our estimates and Burns'
standard trend-cycle can, therefore, be deemed significant.
20Population and related• figures on the gainfully occupied are used, in the annual
estimates of national income since 1919 to check the coverage of the 'industry by
industry subtotals; and for the decade series for the, period before 1919 primarily
to estimate construction, for decades before 18,70(as the basis for the allowance
for depreciation in the period since 1869). In both •uses, the quantitative• effect of
population data on national income estimates is: so minor that the two series may
be treated as virtually independent.66 PART II
However, these fluctuations in the rate of growth of popu-
lation are much narrower in amplitude than those in the rate
of growth of national income, total or per capita. Part of
the difference may be due to defects of annual population
estimates, which, for lack of basic data, do not reflect true
annual change sensitively. But part of the differenceis un-
doubtedly genuine, population not responding as readily to
whatever factors produce these swings in the rate of growth
of both it and national income. Another significant difference
is in the timing of the long swings: while the timing pattern
in national income and population is fairly, similar, the swings
in the latter lag behind those in the former. The troughs and
peaks in the population rates of growth lag fairly consistently
by one interval behind those in the rates of growth of national
income.Thissuggeststhat whateverthecontributionof
fluctuations in the rate of change of population to those in
the rate of change of national income, the former are more
in the nature of a delayed effect of whatever factors produce
the swings in the rate of change of national income.
We now turntofluctuationsintherate of changein
the flow of goods to consumers and its components (Table
20). With respect to the timing of these fluctuations, there
issubstantial similarity between the flow of goods to con-
sumers and national income (cól. 6 and 7)—not surprising in
view of the 'preponderant proportion the former constitutes
of the latter. Nor isit surprising to find the swings in the
rate of 'change in •the volume of services similar to those in
the flow of goods to consumers—since the decade estimates
for services were derived by applying gradually rising sample
ratios to total consumer commodities. But it is significant that
the swings in the rates of change in the three groups of con-
sumer commodities are similar—since the estimates for per-
ishable,semidurable,anddurablecommodities wereeach
derived independently. Apparently whatever factors tend to
produce these swings affect the flow of the major categories
of consumer commodities at roughly the same time.
While the timing issimilar, the amplitude of the swings
is not. That in the rates of change in perishable and semi-LONG TERM CHANGES, 1869-1938 67
TABLE 20
Fluctuations in Rates of Growth, Flow of Goods to Consumers
and Its Components (1929 Prices), 1869-1938
PERCENTAGE DEVIATIONS FROM STRAIGHT LINE OR 3 POINT CURVE
TO RATES OF PERCENTACE CHANCE BETWEEN OVERLAPPING DECADES
CENTRAL Flow of
YEAR OF Perish- Goods toNational
PERIOD able*Semidurable DurableServicesConsumersIncome
(1) (2) (3) (4.) (5) (6). (7)
1 1876 +10.5 ±5.4 +3.2 +6.1 +9.2 +8.5
2 1881 —0.2 +1.3 +5.6 —1.3 +0.7 +0.1
3 1886 —11.1 —6.1 —2.8 —10.0 —9.4 —8.3
4 1891 —6.1 —7.9 —11.1 —9.3 —8.6 —8.4.
5 1896 +5.3 —0.1 —4.1 +3.4 +1.7 +0.4
6 1901 +6.0 +5.7 +0.3 +9.9 +5.2 +4.6
7 1906 +2.2 +3.3 +5.8 +2.0 +2.8
8 .1911 —2.4 —1.7 —1.7 —4.3 —3.7 —1.9
9 1916 —1.8 —2.6 +7.1 +4.7 +0.7 +1.1
10 1921 +6.8 +28.2 +9.4 +8.7 +10.1
11 1926 —1.9 +4.7 —0.8 —1.5 .+0.5 —0.9
12 1931 —2.1 —7.2 —16.9 —9.9 —5.1 —6.1
Sum Mea.rure.r, 1869-1938
13 Av. % rate of
growth per
quinquennium+19.5 +16.8 +19.9 +22.0 +19.9 +18.6
14 Av. % rate of
retardation per
quinquennium—1.9 —2.4- —1.4 —1.8 —2.2
15 Av. % devia-
tion (geometric
mean) 4.5 4.5 7.0 6.6 4.7 4.5
*Deviatjons from a 3 point curve; all other columns, deviations from a straight line.
COLUMN
2-6 Calculated from estimates in National Product since 1869,TableII 8, cot. 6-10.
7 Table 19, col. 2.
durable commoditiesisdistinctly narrower than in durable
or in services (line 15)The reasons are not easily suggest-
ed. But itisinteresting to note that the wider amplitude in
durable commodities is due largely to the difference for the
last observable swing(lines 8-12)comprising the jntervals
centered on 1911, 1916, 1921, 1926, and 1931; whereas the
wider amplitude for servicesisobservable in the last two
swings. The general sensitiveness of consumer durable goods
tofluctuationsinecOnomicconditions,particularlyduring
use of the three point curve for the perishable group does not affect the
comparison, since the average deviation from the straight lineis only slightly
larger (4.7 instead of 4.5).68 .. PARTIl
recent decades when they comprised more semi-luxuries than in
earlier times,isreadily admitted. And perhaps thereisa
similar element of semi-luxury demand in the services category,
especially since the extension and intensification of the urban
style of living.
While the long swings in the rate of. change in the flow of
goods to consumers and inits components are similar with
respect to timing and not too differentin amplitude from
thoseinnational income,distinctlydiflerentcharacteristics
emerge for net capital formation and the two of its com-
ponents for which analysisin terms of percentage changes
is possible(Table. .21). For the producer durable category,
the timing of the swingsthe rate of changeisclosely
similar to that in national income and in the flow of goods
to consumers. But the amplitude is much wider, the geometric
mean deviation being over 25percentas compared with less
than 5percentfor national income and the flow of goods to
consumers; and this 'despite the use of the three point curve
which in this case, unlike others, yields a much smaller aver-
age deviation than a straight line. To a considerable extent,
however, this wider amplitudeisdue tothefact that the
flow of producer durables is measured net, and fluctuations
in its rate of change compared with the qross flow of goods
to consumers. Yet even for gross producer durables, the aver-
age deviation from the threepoint curve is 7.5percent—greater
than for any component analyzed so far.22
Fluctuations in the rate of change of construction are of
still wider amplitude; and even when taken gross, the volume
of construction is subject to rates of change whose fluctuations
average more than 12 percent. Equally significant is the dif-
ferent' timing of swings in the rate of change .in construction:
22Arthur F. Burns has found a related difference in the amplitude of 'trend-cycles'
between consumer goods ("products destined for human consumption") and pro-
ducer goods ("products which find final realization in industrial equipment"). For
29 consumer goods series both the median and arithmetic mean of trend-cycle
amplitudes were 1.6 percent (in terms of annual rates of growth) ;for 14 producer
goods series the median of trend-cycle amplitudes was 2.4' percent, the arithmetic
mean, 2.6 percent (see Production Trends in the United States since 1870, note 44,
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TABLE 21
Fluctuations in Rates of Growth
Net Capital Formation and Its Components (1929 Prices), 1869-1938'
PERCENTAGE DEVIATIONS FROM STRAIGHT LINE OR 3 POINT CURVE FITTEI)
TO RATES OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE BETWEEN OVERLAPPING DECADES
CENTRAL Net Net Net
YEAR OF ProducerConstrue-CapitalNationalBuildingPopu-
PERIOD Durable' don Income Permits Iation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 ' 1876 +60.1 —20.6 +30.9 —13.2 ' +0.5
2 1881 +4.9 —1.9 +6.4 +0.1 +14.3 +0.5
3 1886 —27.7 +11.1 —2.0 —8.3 +10.6 +0.3
4 1891 —33.4 —6.1 —13.4 —8.4 —11.5 ,—0.4
5 1896 +7.4 —15.2 —14.7 +0.4 —18.3 —0.7
6 1901 +29.7 +12.5 —7.6 +4.6 —0.3
7 1906 —12.8 +23.9 +1.6 +2.8 +8.5 ,+0.4
8 1911 +6.7 —5.3 ±10.4 ' —1.9 —16.8 +0.2
9 1916 +17.1 —16.2 +14.0 +1.1 +12.0 —0.6
10 1921 +31.7+159.1 +48.0 +10.1 +88.3 +0.3
11 1926 —17.1 +66.0 +7.0. —0.9 +3.5 +0.6




quinquennium+3.3 —2,5 —1.7 ,+18.6 +11.7 +9.3
14 Av. % rate of
retardation per
quinquennium—8.3 —10.1 —9.7 —2.2 —5.4 —0.6
15 Av. % devia-
tion (geometric
mean) 25.2 37.1 18.9 4.5 21.4 0.5
from a 3 point curve; columns 3, 5, and 6, deviations from a straight line.
COLUMN
2-4 Calculated from estimatesin National Product since1869, 'Table II15,
col. 6-10.'
5 & 7 Table 19, col. 2 and 3.
6 Calculated from estimates given for 1874-1929 in Arthur F. Burns, Produc-
tion Trends in the United States since 1870, pp. 302-303, and extrapblated
from 1929 on the basis of an index derived by dividing the permit valuation
of building operations(Statistical 1942, Table 960, p. 990)by a
costof Construction index calculated from estimatesinNational Product
since 1869, Tables I 7 and I8, col.8. The 1869-78 decade was extrapolated
on the basis of changes in gross construction, with a rough allowance for
the wider amplitude of decade to decade changes in the building permits
series,
the first two swings lag substantially behind those in national
income or the flow of producer durables, the 'third alone is
synchronous with that in national income and its other major
components. That both the wider amplitude and different
timing are characteristic of long term swings in the rate of70 PART II
change in construction is confirmed by
permits(col. 6). The latter, reflecting
construction, shows an average deviatio
percent, and swings of a timing closely
net construction in column 3•23
Thecoincidence betweenthe swings in the rate of change
in construction and those in population (col. 3 and 7)is of
interest: in the last two swings, the peaks and troughs in the
rate of change in construction and in population are synchro-
nous except for the peak in the last, and even in the first
swing constructIon, like population, reaches a peak later than
the rate of change in national income and itsother com-
ponents. There is thus a definite suggestion that changes in
the rate of growth of population affect those in the rate of
growth of construction, presumably through the influence of
the former primarily on residential construction and types
closely related toit(commercial, some of the public utility,
educational, etc.).
Because of the lack of synchronism between the swings in
the rates of change in producer durable commodities and in
construction, and the importance of these two components
in net capital formation, the swings in the rate of change
in the latter are a hybrid dissimilar to those in either com-
ponent or in national income (cot. 4). Indeed, as a result of
the cancellation of divergent fluctuations in the components,
two rather than three distinct swings are observed in the rate
of change innet capital formation. The amplitude of the
swings, though narrower than in either producer durables or
23The lackofsynchronism in timing between the long swings in construction and
those in comprehensive measures of production at large is also confirmed by Burns'
findings. His measures of conformity to the standard trend-cycle pattern, which
measure the degree of similarity in timing between the trend-cycles of any given
series and that of the general pattern of all industries, are fairly low for construc-
tion. Of nine series classified as relating to construction (see ibid., Chart 18, p. 222,
and Tables 35 and 36, pp. 216-19), the most important—building permits—has an
index of conformity of —0.11; two others (gypsum and white lead) have indexes
below 0; one (flaxseed consumption), an index of 0; of the remaining series the
two relating to rails each have indexes of 0.60; two (nails and total cement), in-
dexes of 0.50; and one (roofing slate), an index of 0.37. The low conformity, par-
ticularly of series closely related to residential construction, is conspicuous.
the series on buildin'g
the grossvolumeof
n of more than 21
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construction,remains wide; and even
averages 6.0 percent, wider than in
consumers or in national income.
The analysis of fluctuationsinthe
perforce be confined here to national
components by type of use; and has
further beforesufficientlightisshed
type of change in thc rate of growth
been discussed here at some length
inusing the long term trends of the past asa basis for
judging thefuture.Obviously,theexistence of these long
swings in the rate of secular movement must always be borne
in mind in trying to interpret economic changes observed over
a few decades; and they render particularly difficult judgments
of prospective secular levels based upon observations confined
to two or three decades of an immediate past.
In addition, the analysis suggests conclusions relevant to a
proper interpretation of the fluctuations of thel920's and
1930's.Tables19-2 1indicatethattheserecent .decades
witnessed a coincidence of the long swings inthe rates of
secular changeinallthecomponents ofnational income,
includingconstruction,whereasduringtheearlierdecades
swings in the rate of change in construction followed a timing
pattern different from that in the flow of goods to consumers
and in producer durabl.e commodities. Whether this circum-
stanceseivcstoexplainthespecialseverityof economic
fluctuations in the recent two decades is a question that can-
not be answered deflnitivel.y here. But this conclusion from the
just presented may help in understanding the events
of the last two decades, and in forming a proper judgment
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